Schwarcz's illuminating chapter on the role of credit rating agencies.' As I find myself largely in agreement with the analytical framework his chapter proposes, my comments will focus on extending his analysis to additional issues that arise when governmental bodies incorporate the views of private credit rating agencies into supervisory procedures. This regulatory incorporation of the work of rating agencies has become commonplace in the United States over the past few decades and, as Schwarcz indicates, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) recently proposed to include analogous procedures in the Committee's revised capital adequacy standards.
BACKGROUND ON REGULATORY INCORPORATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
As Schwarcz's chapter explains, the traditional role of credit ratings has been to assist investors in evaluating the debt securities of particular corporations.
While the issuer typically pays its agency's fee, the ratings are designed to help i nvestors assess the issuer's creditworthiness. To preserve the value of their ratings in this market, credit agencies need to maintain a good reputation for accurate ratings, and the desire of the agencies to maintain their reputations enhances the credibility of ratings. As Schwarcz suggests, this alignment of interests is what makes the market work in this area. The trilateral relationship among issuers, rating agencies, and investors is illustrated in Figure 19 .1. 
. Traditional role o f rating agencies
Recognising the unique capacity of private credit rating agencies to evaluate the creditworthiness of a broad range of issuers, regulatory agencies in the United States have made increasing use of ratings in supervisory settings. 3 A Basel Committee working group recently issued a working paper which surveys regulatory incorporation of rating agencies in a broader range of jurisdictions.
According to this study, the United States makes the greatest use of regulatory incorporation, but a number of other jurisdictions have recently followed suit, prompted by the Basel Committee's market risk amendment to the original 3 For a more complete discussion of the ways in which US regulatory agencies have incorporated ,private credit agencies, see F. Partnoy, "The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies" (1999) No.
-3) < http://www.bis.org/pubi/bcbs -wp3.pd f> (hereinafter cited as "Credit Ratings Working Paper").
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Basle Accord. In this comment, I refer to these uses collectively as regulatory incorporation of rating agencies, but I also distinguish among several different kinds of regulatory incorporation. One use entails the definition of jurisdictional boundaries. When Schwarcz refers to SEC Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 4 he is citing an example of this sort of regulatory incorporation. In the United States, when a corporation invests in a pool of securities, the corporation is presumptively subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a legal regime designed to protect i nvestors from various sorts of investment frauds In the 1980s, this jurisdictional structure created problems for the emerging market for securitised assets. Eventually, the SEC created an exemption from the 1940 Act for pools of securitised assets with an adequate rating from an accredited rating agency . 6 The logic of this exemption was that, if the pool received a good enough credit rating, then the investor protections of the 1940 Act would be superfluous. In this context, an adequate credit rating has become the path to exemption from supervision .
7
Another common context for regulatory incorporation of rating agencies is where supervisory standards impose restrictions on the structure of the balance sheet of a regulated entity, such as a bank or insurance company or securities firm. Sometimes the authority of a related entity to hold a certain type of investment will depend on whether or not the investment has received a rating from a private rating agency; at other times the amount that the firm is permitted to invest in a particular security will rise or fall depending on whether or not the security is rated. A good example of this approach can be found in the SEC rules governing money market mutual funds. Under rule 2a-7 under the 1940 Act,' the authority of money market mutual funds to invest in a corporation's debt securities depends on the number of firms that have rated the securities and the quality of the ratings. Rather than developing its own standard for appropriate investments, the SEC piggybacks on the pre-existing work of rating agencies.'
Another context in which private credit rating agencies participate in regulatory standards is in the area of capital requirements. Often, the amount of capital a regulated entity is required to maintain depends on the volume of the . entity's assets-for example, in a simple regime, eight dollars of capital might° 17 CFR § 270.3a-7 (2000) , discussed in S. Schwarcz, 298. s 15 U S C § § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000) . For an overview of this regulatory structure and a discussion of the definition of investment company under the 1940 Act, see H. E. Jackson and E. S. Symons, ( Minneapolis, Minn., West Publications, 1999) 811-50. F See SEC Final Rule on Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Finance, 57 Fed Reg 56,248-01 (Nov. 27, 1992) ("[r] ating agency evaluations tend to address most of the [1940] Act's concerns regarding abusive practices, such as self-dealing and overreaching by i nsiders, misvaluation of assets, and inadequate. asset coverage").
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' In a similar spirit are rules that liberalised the disclosure obligations of investment-grade bonds.
See SEC Form S-3 under the Securities Act of 1933.
" 17 CFR 5 270.2a-7 (2000) .
9 See also 12 CFR § 704.6 (2000) (using similar technique to determine authority of corporate credit unions to invest in debt).
be required for every 100 dollars of assets. More complex capital requirements vary the amount of capital required for various types of assets, and one way US regulators have distinguished among assets is to permit lower capital reserves for assets that have higher credit ratings. 10 Again the logic underlying these distinctions is that higher credit ratings imply that the assets are less risky than other, unrated or lower-rated assets.
RATING AGENCIES UNDER THE BASEL COMMITTEE PROPOSALS OF JUNE 1999
The Basel Committee proposals of June 1999 are an example of regulatory incorporation of rating agencies into the development of capital standards."
Under the original Basel rules-developed in the 1980s-all commercial loans were subject to the same capital requirement of 8 per cent. Under the Committee's recent proposal, the amount of capital required for commercial loans would vary between 4 per cent and 12 per cent depending on the credit rating of the issuer. Loans to issuers with high ratings-either AAA or AA in the S&P system-would be subject to only 4 per cent capital ratings .12 Loans to issuers with the next tier of ratings-A+ to B-in the S&P system-would retain the current capital requirement of 8 per cent. Loans to issuers with lower ratings would be subject to 12 per cent capital requirements. Loans to borrowers without credit ratings would remain subject to the current 8 per cent capital rules. The Basel Committee's proposed reliance on private credit ratings has an intuitive appeal. To begin with, the Committee's original approach to commercial loans was undeniably crude. While the original Basel proposals made distinctions between other categories of assets (for example, sovereign debt and bank credits), all commercial loans had the same risk weightings and that '° See, e.g., 17 CFR § 240.15c3-1 (2000) (net capital rules for SEC-registered broker-dealers). 1 ' In this comment, I limit my remarks to the aspects of the Committee's proposal dealing with corporate borrowers. The proposal has analogous recommendations for sovereign debt and bank credits.
12
Throughout this comment, I will refer to the S&P rating system for illustrative purposes. As Schwarcz explains in his chapter, other agencies have different but analogous nomenclature. See S. L. Schwarcz, 299-300.
Issuer
Current Proposed
AAA to AA 8 % 1.6%
A+ to B-
% 8
Below B-
meant that bank loans to blue chip companies such as IBM and Microsoft were subject to the same capital requirements as loans to the most risky start-up enterprises, even though the credits clearly exposed lenders to substantially different amounts of risk. The Basel Committee's proposed incorporation of private ratings into capital adequacy calculations attempts to redress this flaw in the original proposal.
CRITICISMS
Despite the appeal of the Committee's proposed use of private credit ratings, the proposal has been subject to a series of criticisms, ranging from technical critiques to fundamental challenges.t 17 per cent.l s Thus, whereas the Basel Committee allowed for only a threefold variation in capital requirements (from 4 percent to 12 per cent), the implication of Figure 19 .3 is that more than a tenfold differential would be appropriate. A separate concern about the Basel Committee's proposal reflects an unease with the premise that information provided by private credit rating agencies will actually assist supervisory authorities in setting capital standards. One version of this concern derives from observations that credit rating agencies tend to raise the credit rating of borrowers in economic boom times and lower the credit ratings in times of economic difficulty.
2°W
hile this practice may accurately reflect default risk to investors-and thus be a sensible practice in the context of the traditional role of credit rating agencies-it has a potentially perverse effect if incorporated into government-imposed capital requirements. It allows banks to lower their capital reserves in economic expansion, but requires an increase in capital requirements in economic downturns. This is precisely the opposite of what financial economists suggest to be the optimal approach for capital standards. This problem is one of the consequences of grafting a market mechanism into a regulatory standard that the mechanism was not initially designed to serve.
An additional and deeper problem with the Basel Committee's reliance on rating agencies is the fact that the proposal builds on the original and simplistic approach that the Committee's earlier standards established for setting capital requirements for credit risks. The approach entails establishing capital standards for each category of asset held by a particular institution and then adding the individual requirements together to arrive at a total capital requirement for the institution. As numerous commentators have recognised, this additive approach to capital requirements ignores the fact that the risks of individual assets may be correlated with other assets in a firm's portfolio in different ways.
21
A bank with all its loans committed to the highly-rated firms in the oil 'e See, e.g., Shadow Committee Comment, n. 13 above, 12.
'y Indeed, critics have interpreted the current proposal as an effort on the part of the Basel Committee to enlist the support of countries where few commercial issuers are rated: ibid.
z° See Altman and Saunders, n. 14 above, 6-8. 21 See, e.g., Shadow Committee Comment, n. 13 above, 12.
and gas industry is exposed to more risk that a firm with loans extended to a diversity of highly-rated borrowers; yet the Basel Committee proposal-being sensitive only to the credit rating of individual borrowers-would impose the same capital requirement on both institutions. By incorporating the credit rat- To address these deeper concerns, one must seek alternative approaches to capital setting standards. And, indeed, there is afoot a movement towards new capital standards based on overall portfolio risks. Already in the area of market risks-that is risks on assets held in trading accounts-regulators have developed various portfolio approaches to the establishment of capital requirements. 24 And, in its 1999 proposal, the Basel Committee intimated that a similar approach might eventually be developed for credit risks, thus providing an alternative to the additive asset-based approach upon which the Committee has hitherto relied for dealing with credit risks. Unfortunately, the development of capital standards based on portfolio models is extraordinarily complex. It relies on detailed analyses of the correlations in performance of many different types of assets. In some areas, historical data can provide the basis of such analyses; but often-particularly for new types of credits-such historical information is not available. In addition, it is possible that the appropriate way to measure credit risk will vary from institution to institution. To date, regulatory authorities have relied upon two different approaches to portfolio models: standard models which can be used by a wide range of institutions and internal models, which depend on individual models developed for individual institutions (subject to general standards and review by regulatory authorities).
In the area of credit risks, capital standards based on portfolio models are in an early stage of development. Experts differ on how soon practical applications of these models will be possible.
25
Whether it will be possible to develop standard models that generate more appropriate capital requirements for a wide range of institutions than the Basel proposal of 1999 would provide is open to debate. Reliance on internal models of larger and more sophisticated financial intermediaries appears to offer more promise in the near term. This approach,
however, raises the difficult question of how much regulatory authorities should delegate the establishment of capital standards to bank management .26 After all, the reason we regulate bank capital requirements in the first place is the belief that left to their own devices banks will maintain less capital than is socially desirable. 27 Thus, the more fundamental criticisms of the Basel Committee's 1999 proposal must be balanced against problems that might arise if regulatory authorities were to move to a more theoretically pleasing, portfolio based model for setting capital standards <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs7l.ht m>. See also Shadow Committee Comment, n. 13 above, 12
(expressing skepticism as to the reliability of existing credit risk models). zs Cf. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Internal Ratings Capital Standards and Subordinated Debt, (Statement No 7, February 2000) <http://www.aei.org/shdw/ shdweuro7.htm > ("[Slince banks face a degree of protection, they have the incentive to take excessive risk and, therefore, to manipulate the ratings used to allocate capital"). 27 As discussed above, it is possible that the final Basel Committee proposal will allow at least some banks to use internal rating systems for capital measures. See Speech by William J.
McDonough, n. 16 above. See also Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord, n. 1 above (proposi ng greater reliance on internal models). Such an approach falls short of full-blown credit modelling, because the capital requirements are not based on overall portfolio risk. It does, however, allow for more tailored capital requirements based on individualised models. zs T o be fair, internal models typically must comply with regulatory standards and are also subj ect to periodic back testing. Notwithstanding these safeguards, internal standards increase the ability of individual institutions to influence their own capital standards. While I would agree with Schwartz that the market has, to date, worked relatively well in this area, I think it also important to recognise that the regulatory incorporation of credit ratings in bank capital requirements puts greater pressure on the system. Currently, an issuer's credit rating affects only its access to capital markets; under the Basel proposal, a rating will also affect the borrower's cost of commercial loans from regulated entities (since the cost of higher capital charges will likely be passed on to borrowers, at least in part). As the importance of credit ratings increases, the pressure to get better ratings will also increase. This change could increase the need for governmental oversight of rating agencies.
Another important point to note about the Basel proposals is that it somewhat changes the structure of the market for credit ratings. In the past-as Schwartz explains-the real consumer of credit ratings was individual investors, and the reason the market has worked is that rating agencies need to preserve their reputation for accurate assessors of credit risk. Under the Basel proposal, bank regulators will also "consume" credit ratings and use those ratings to set capital standards for regulated institutions. One wonders whether '°In a similar spirit, one critic of regulatory incorporation of credit ratings has suggested that regulators rely instead in market movements of interest rates on debt. See Partnoy, n. 3 above.
31 Shadow Committee Comment, n. 13 above, 16-17. centralised regulators will be as good monitors of credit rating agencies as have decentralised market forces in the past.
In addition, when one recalls that one of the goals of the Basel Capital Accords was to encourage national regulators to raise capital requirements for local banks, one can appreciate the potential problem of this new use of credit rating agencies.
If banking officials in a particular country are reluctant to force local banks to raise capital to the standards set by the Basel Committee, one way to subvert compliance is to accept higher-than-appropriate ratings from local rating agencies. In other words, as the Basel Committee's 1999 proposal allows national regulators latitude for setting capital requirements for commercial credits, the goal of maintaining uniform capital standards across national boundaries may be jeopardised.
Collectively the foregoing concerns raise the possibility that the Basel Committee's recent proposal and other regulatory incorporations of rating agencies at the national level could undermine the quality of credit ratings, thereby generating a form of credit rating inflation. This is, it should be noted, the inverse of the principal concern over rating agencies that Schwarcz raises in his chapterthat rating agencies might issue credit ratings that were inappropriately stringent. 3 z My fear is that market forces will lead agencies in the other direction .33
A final question to be posed about the Basel Committee's incorporation of credit rating agencies is its implications for developing countries. In many parts of the world, few private borrowers have privately rated debt. Indeed, the credit rating industry is largely a phenomenon of the United States and other advanced economies. 
